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GOOGLE’S ANTI-COMPETITIVE AND UNFAIR PRACTICES IN DIGITAL LEISURE MARKETS 
ANCA D CHIRITA1* 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to reflect on the critical use of commitments in the Google 
case and to analyse and review the matrix of facts that have been highlighted in the academic and 
practitioner literature. Therefore, the core area of reflection in this contribution are relevant 
markets; barriers to entry; network and lock-in effects; dominance; and potential anti-competitive, 
as well as unfair practices as regards commercial advertisements. The analysis of the online search-
engine market is complemented by the comparative insights offered by the US class action against 
Google’s Android mobile applications. In the EU, a similar trend is noticeable in the complaining 
tone of Google’s competitors. Coupled with the transitional period of the mandate of the newly 
appointed Commissioner for Competition and the political sensitivity over the potential to misuse 
search-engine users’ personal data to serve commercial purposes, such as boosting its advertising 
revenues, the giant Google swims in uncertain waters. 
 
I. THE MAIN CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES OF THE GOOGLE CASE 
 
One of the most controversially debated investigations2 by practitioners, academics, and even 
politicians,3 is that of Google: a saga of long negotiated and re-negotiated commitments,4 which has 
                                                          
* Lecturer in competition law, Durham Law School, England, UK. This paper was presented on 26 September 2014 at the 
CLaSF Workshop at the IE Law School in Madrid, Spain. I would like to thank the organisers and participants of the 
wonderful Competition Law Scholars Forum XXIII Workshop ‘Competition Law in Leisure Markets’ for many insightful 
suggestions, comments and questions, in particular, Angus McCulloch, Alan Riley, Barry Rodger, Francisco Marcos, Ben 
van Rompuy, Fernando Diez, and Cristina Volpin. 
2 The EC started its investigation against Google almost four years ago, see EC, ‘Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of 
antitrust violations by Google’, IP/10/1624, 30 November 2010; Cases COMP/C-3/39740, Foundem v Google; COMP/C-
3/39775, Ciao v Google, and COMP/C-3/39768, 1PlusC v Google Inc. (Google). 
3 Apart from the EU Commissioner for Competition, J Almunia, see e.g., the German Minister of Justice, H Maas, ‘Das letzte 
Mittel ist die Entflechtung von Google’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 June 2014, who considered a possible 
divesture of Google as a remedy of last resort; cf. that a lack of internet regulation does not allow competition authorities to 
divest Google, see, very recently the President of the German competition authority, A Mundt, ‘Kartellamt lehnt 
Zerschlagung von Google ab’, WallStreet: online, 8 October 2014; for an economist’s similar view, see e.g. J Haucap, ‘Eine 
Zerschlagung von Google würde wenig bringen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 April 2014; for the political opinion 
that divesting Google is impossible because Google is established elsewhere in the US, see e.g. the German Minister for 
Internal Affairs, Thomas de Maizière, who is in sharp contrast to the socialist Ministry of Economics, Sigmar Gabriel, The 
Wall Street Journal Deutschland, ‘Gabriels großer Google-Bluff’, 16 May 2014; Reuters, ‘German vice chancellor urges 
stricter rules for Google and peers’, Berlin 14 October 2014, Fortunately, UK ministers do not seem to care about Google’s 
fate. Otherwise, DG COMP would soon start pooling political opinions. 
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been paved with public criticism for the lack of any antitrust fine being imposed on Google for its 
allegedly anti-competitive business conduct, with academic criticism for a continued lack of new 
‘precedents’ under Article 102 TFEU, and with an uncertain political climate inspired by the 
announcement of the transition to another mandate of the new Commissioner for Competition.5 
What, then, will happen to Google? Recent political statements, such as that by Commissioner 
Almunia, have suggested that Google could even end up involved in a case bigger than that of 
Microsoft.6 
Arguments for and against intervention have already divided the academic arena with robust and 
pertinent argumentation on both sides.7 The previous approach by the US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC)8 demonstrates that choosing not to pursue a case against Google9 is equally 
litigious, as consumer associations reacted with a class action introduced before the US District 
Court of California.10 This is a very welcome development, and one that is inspiring a comparative 
precedent for the European Commission (EC). In contrast, the EC’s decision to agree on negotiated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Generally on commitments procedure, see e.g. EC, ‘To Commit or not to Commit?’ 3 Comp Policy brief (2014); on the 
EC’s wide margin of discretion after Alrosa, see e.g. M Messina and JC Alexandre Ho, ‘Re-establishing the Orthodoxy of 
Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: Comment on Commission v Alrosa’ 36 Eur L Rev (2011), 
747; F Wagner-von Papp, ‘Best and Even Better Practices in Commitment Procedures after Alrosa: The Dangers of 
Abandoning the ‘Struggle for Competition Law’’, 49 Common Market L Rev (2012), 941; on the ‘policitization’ of 
commitments, see e.g., N Dunne, ‘Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law’ 10 J of Comp L & Ec 2 (2014), 440. 
5 See the incoming Commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, on the use of settlements that ‘enable cases to be closed rather than 
to be dragged over years and years’, in Reuters, FY Chee and A Macdonald, ‘New EU antitrust head not swayed by anti-
Americanism bullies’, 23 September 2014. See also Euractiv, ‘Vestager dodges questions on Google probe, Irish tax 
loophole’, 3 October 2014. 
6 Reuters, ‘EU’s Almunia says may probe Google’s non-search services’, 23 September 2014. 
7 See as dismissive of Google’s alleged biased search results, in particular, RH Bork and JG Sidak, ‘ What Does the Chicago 
School Teach about Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google’ 8 J of Comp L & Ec (2012); GA Manne and JD 
Wright, ‘Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google’ Harvard J of L & Public 
Policy 34 (2011) 1; in favour of intervention, see e.g. I Lianos and E Motchenkova, ‘Market Dominance and Search Quality 
in the Search Engine Market’ J of Comp L & Ec (2013);  MA Carrier, ‘Google and Antitrust: Five Approaches to an Evolving 
Issue’ Harvard J of L & Technology Occasional Paper Series, July 2013; MR Patterson, ‘Google and Search-Engine Market 
Power’ Harvard J of L & Technology Occasional Paper Series, July 2013; R Burguet, R Caminal and M Ellman, ‘In Google 
We Trust?’ Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series no 717 (2013); N Zingales, ‘Product Market Definition in Online Search 
and Advertising’ 9 Comp L Rev 1 (2013). 
8 The FTC acknowledged that alterations by Google of its algorithm deprived competing advertisement sites of traffic; see 
e.g., AA Foer and S Vaheesan, ‘Google: the unique case of monopolistic search engine’, 24 June 2013, available at 
http://www.blog.oup.com/2013/06/google-monopoly-search/. 
9 Two commentators attributed non-intervention to the influential views of R Bork and JG Sidak, ‘What Does the Chicago 
School Teach about Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?’ 8 J of Comp L & Ec (2012) 663, see e.g. F 
Pasquale and S Vaidhyanathan, ‘Borking Antitrust: Google Secures Its Monopoly Dissent’, Dissent, 4 January 2013, 
available on http://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/borking-antitrust-google-secures-its-monopoly . 
10 US Class Action Complaint 010437-11 683086 VI, para 74. Previously, the District Court of California ruled that there 
is no separate online market for search queries; see District Court of the Northern District of California, Kinderstart.com, 
LLC v Googl Inc., C 06-2057 JF, 2007 WL 831806, 16 March 2007. 
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commitments,11 instead of fining Google, is by no means a better deal. On the one hand, this sends 
across the Atlantic a positive signal of convergence with the FTC’s philosophy of not protecting 
competitors12 under the Sherman Act, which twists the EC’s approach to one of protecting 
competition irrespective of what competitors or intermediary consumers say about their rivals. 
However, this is a critical use of commitment decisions that were intended to be used only as an 
exceptional remedy.13 
The EU Commissioner for Competition acknowledged at his hearing before the European Parliament 
that ‘antitrust enforcement is about consumer welfare, innovation and choice, not about protecting 
competitors’.14 On the other hand, despite not yet having the privilege of a similar consumers’ class 
action, the lack of any clear reaction on the part of the EC against Google can only upset the 
legitimate expectations of Google’s competitors, including Microsoft, Expedia, Yelp, TripAdvisor,15 
the European Consumer Organisation,16 European publishers, an association of picture industries 
and photo libraries, a telecom operator, and an advertising platform.17 The huge number of 
competitors with complaints against Google shows that this case is very different from the situation 
faced by the Microsoft giant.  
Recent EU news demonstrates that the Google saga is far from over,18 with suggestions of possible 
investigations, inter alia, into mobile applications and social networks.19 There is an emerging trend 
                                                          
11 EC, ‘Antitrust: Commission obtains from Google comparable display of specialised search rivals’, MEMO/14/87, 5 
February 2014; EC, Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39740, 3 April 20133; A Lamadrid de Pablo, ‘EU Google 
Commitments’, J of Eur Comp L & Practice (2013); A Leyden and M Dolmans, ‘The Google Commitments: Now with a 
Cherry on Top’ J of Eur Comp L & Practice (2014). 
12 See e.g. Ratliff and Rubinfeld, cited below, 13. 
13 On the use of commitments as ‘unusual and rare’, see e.g. J Temple Lang, ‘Commitment Decisions and Settlements with 
Antitrust Authorities and Private Parties under European Antitrust Law’ in BE Hauwk (ed), International Antitrust Law and 
Policy (Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2005) 265. 
14 See EC, J Almunia, ‘The Google antitrust case: what is at stake?’, European Parliament hearing, Brussels, 1 October 2013, 
Speech/13/768. 
15 Financial Times, ‘EU: Yelp, TripAdvisor launch new anti-Google campaign’, 30 September 2014. 
16 See a recent complaint by Hot Maps on the EC’s monitoring of commitments undertaking by Google, e.g. K Fiveash, 
‘Google will ‘pre-select’ an ‘independent’ competition inspector in EU search case’, The Register, 18 June 2014; that the EC 
receive ‘very, very negative’ feedback from Microsoft and Expedia, see e.g. A White and F Rotondi, ‘Google Concessions 
Sought by EU to Rescue Antitrust Pact’, Bloomberg Businessweek, 8 September 2014; D Meyer, ‘Yelp piles into Google EU 
antitrust case with formal complaint about local search’, 9 July 2014, gigaom.com. 
17 See Reuters, above note 5. 
18 See e.g. ‘EU: Google rethinks concessions as Commission’s case continues’, 22 September 2014, Competition Policy 
International. 
19 J Kanter, ‘Google’s European antitrust woes are far from over’ Economic Times, 23 June 2014. For a similar approach 
see e.g. the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, press release, ‘Google Agrees to Change its Business Practices to Resolve FTC 
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of expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome reached by competition enforcers. This comes from 
both intermediary and final users of Google’s search engine and additional tied services.  
Finally, in recent years, the EC has all too often20 used commitments in previous cases, such as 
Rambus,21 Microsoft,22 IBM, 23Apple E-books,24 Samsung,25 and most notably in the energy sector,26 
which has caused alarm bells to ring. One has to question why the decision to commit is better in 
highly litigious cases of unfair competition against rivals, but not in other cases, such as Google’s, 
where the decline in the quality of the search engine affects all of its users, not only competitors’ 
inability to match the efficacy of this innovative search-engine. In certain instances, negotiated 
commitments can only restore competition for the future, as is the case, for example, with the 
commitment to refrain from entering into de facto exclusivity agreements.27 Thus, the above 
commitment cannot undo the anti-competitive harm already being caused and subsequently, no 
civil claims can be made on the same grounds. The better alternative remains the imposition of a 
fine. In particular, there is a persistent perception of preferential ranking of Google’s own services 
vis-à-vis those of its rivals.28 While a separate display of ‘generic’ and ‘specialised’, i.e., advertised, 
search results will no doubt improve the user experience, the additional requirement of listing three 
vertical links to rivals’ specialised searches partially addresses the competitors’ rather than the 
generic users’ concerns. The EC continues its investigation concerning Google’s alleged abuse of 
dominance in relation to Android. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search, 3 January 
2013. 
20 There have been at least eighteen commitment decisions during the last ten years and, more significantly, almost 40% of 
these commitments fall under the scope of Article 102 TFEU. 
21 EC, decision, Rambus, OJ C30/2010; Case COMP/38636, Rambus, 9 December 2009, OJ C30/2009. 
22 See EC, press release, IP/09/1941. 
23 EC, decision, IBM, OJ C18/2012; EC, press release, IP/11/1539. 
24 EC, decision, E-Books, OJ C 73/2013; Case COMP/39847 – E-Books (Penguin), C 4750 final, 25 July 2013; EC, press 
release, IP/12/1367. 
25 Case COMP/39939 –Samsung/Enforcement of UMTS standards essential patents. 
26 Around nine commitment decisions applicable in the electricity and gas sectors. 
27 See Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39740 – Foundem and others, 3 April 2013. 
28 iComp, Press Publishers’ View in Google’s Second Set of Commitment Proposals, 2013, available at www.icomp.org. 
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II. GETTING THE FACTS RIGHT ON GOOGLE’S BUSINESS MODEL 
 
This is probably the most daunting task to be faced; no one knows all the facts, yet everyone seems to 
have an opinion on Google’s fate. Therefore, before getting into the matrix of facts, one has first to 
understand Google’s business model. 
 
A.  A FEW CONTENTIOUS ISSUES: RELEVANT MARKETS, NETWORK EFFECTS, BARRIERS TO 
ENTRY AND THE LOCK-IN EFFECT 
Initially, Google’s founders were not sympathetic to an advertisement-funded, i.e., biased, business 
model for Google’s search engine.29 As licensing the search engine was not a viable option, the 
founders had to compromise; it was then that they started placing sponsored ‘links’. In the primary 
relevant market, Google offers its users, that is, both intermediary and final consumers, a free 
horizontal search engine30 that provides general information available on its online platform.31 In 
the secondary relevant market, Google charges online traders for displaying ‘AdWords’ in its 
vertical search engine, which ranks differently price comparisons for shopping or travelling.32 
Google’s business model is simple: a commercial tie-in agreement serving the marketing purposes of 
online traders subsidises the internet experience of its users surfing through its engine for online 
content. Thus, not all content is organically generated by Google’s engine. Similar to unwanted and 
very annoying TV or newspaper advertising, a multitude of keywords, which are relevant to both 
horizontal searches and vertical advertisements, are inserted into Google’s engine and then 
displayed to the user for free, while an intermediate beneficiary of the keywords ‘Ad’ pays Google 
                                                          
29 On the history of Google’s search engine, see e.g., AD Vanberg, ‘From Archie to Google – Search engine providers and 
emergent challenges in relation to EU competition law’ 3 Eur J of L & Technology 1 (2013), 3. 
30 For the distinction between horizontal and vertical search engine markets, see e.g., A Langford, ‘gMonopoly: Does Search 
Bias Warrant Antitrust or Regulatory Intervention?’ 88 Indiana L J, 1564. 
31 See e.g. DF Spulber, ‘The Map of Commerce: Internet Search, Competition, and the Circular Flow of Information’ 5 J of 
Comp L & Ec 4 (2009), 635; generally on search engines, see e.g., A Milstein, ‘Search Engine Bias as Rechtsproblem’ 11 
Computer und Recht (2013); J Kühling and N Gauß, ‘Suchmaschinen-eine Gefahr für den Informationszugang und die 
Informationsvielfalt’ 51 Zeitschrift für Urheber und Medienrecht 12 (2007); T Höppner, ‘Das Verhältnis von 
Suchmachinen zu Inhalteanbitern an der Schnittstelle von Urheber-und Kartellrecht’ 6 Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 
(2012); J Haucap and C Kehder, ‘Suchmaschinen zwischen Wettbewerb und Monopol: Der Fall Google’, 44 DICE 
Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven (2013). 
32 For the contrary opinion that general and specialised searches are two separate markets, see e.g., Bork and Sidak, cited 
above, 8. 
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revenues each time a user clicks on it. In this way, Google can offer horizontal searches sponsored 
by its advertising revenues. This ‘magic’ circle is Google-centric: the more content is indexed in the 
search engine, the more users it attracts, so the likelihood of clicking on commercial ads increases 
and, consequently, Google’s revenues increase, too. One has to overcome the bone of contention on 
the dual purpose of high-technology markets such as Google’s.33 They are economically two-sided 
markets34 that generate mutual benefits. For example, the search engine ‘network’ produces direct 
benefits to its users as more users discover online content via horizontal searches and indirect 
benefits through the advertising rents charged by Google to intermediate users of its vertically 
integrated online market place,35 where bidders meet auctioneers of commercial Ads. A word of 
caution is needed on the potentially knock-out effect that vertical commercial ads can have when 
interfering with generated horizontal search results: final users, such as TV viewers, generally 
dislike advertising. Therefore, the more Ads that are shown, the more likely it is that users will 
eventually switch to alternative search engines that offer less or no advertising. Nonetheless, 
maintaining a non-irritating degree of commercial advertising cannot work against Google. This 
raises one particular concern since even if switching costs are zero or very low,36 switching or 
‘multi-homing’37 is less likely to occur38 and, therefore, Google’s strategic business model locks-in 
all existing users, without the latter’s discovery of another rival search engine. Competition is ‘a 
                                                          
33 Although implausible, the contrary opinion goes on to contradict that Google is a two-sided market as operating the two 
transactions is a ‘business strategy, not a structural feature of the market’; see e.g. G Luchetta, ‘Is Google Platform a Two-
Sided Market’ J of Comp L & Ec (2013), 9. In contrast, Patterson argued that as price, quality, and output are inter-related, 
one cannot consider Google’s search and advertisement markets in isolation; see e.g. Patterson, cited above, 16. On the 
economics of the two-sided search engine market model, see e.g. Lianos and Motchenkova, cited above, 27. 
34 See e.g. E Engelhardt, A Freytag and V Köllman, ‘Competition policy and vertical integration in internet-based two-sided 
markets: the Google case’ MPRA Paper no 43326 Munich (2012); N Zingales, cited above; F Thépot, ‘Market Power in 
Online Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets’ 36 World Comp L & Ec Rev 2 (2013), 195; M Gal, 
‘Antitrust in High-Technology Industries: A Symposium Introduction’ 8 J of Comp L & Economics 3 (2012); M Armstrong, 
‘Competition in Two-Sided Markets’, 37 RAND J of Ec 3 (2006), 668; L Filistrucchi, D Geradin and E van Damme, 
‘Identifying Two-Sided Markets’ 36 World Comp L & Ec Rev (2013), 33; M Armstrong and J Wright, ‘ Two-Sided markets, 
Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts’ 32 Economic Theory 2 (2007) 353; on the lack of empirical analysis, see 
e.g. A Goldfarb and C Tucker, ‘Substitution Between Offline and Online Advertising Markets’ 7 J of Comp L & Ec (2011), 
37. 
35 For insightful suggestions on ‘search’ and ‘display’ advertising, see Burguet et al. cited above. 
36 See e.g. Bork and Sidak, cited above, 6; R Pollock, ‘Is Google the Next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in 
Internet Search’ Cambridge Working Paper (2009), 26. 
37 For the contrary opinion, see e.g. DA Crane, ‘Search Neutrality and Referral Dominance’ J of Comp L & Ec (2012), 5. 
38 According to Performics, 89% of users would switch to a different search engine if they could not find the information 
they were looking for; see e.g. Performics, press release, ‘ Search Engine Usage Study: 92 Percent of Searchers Click on 
Sponsored Results’, 28 September 2010, available at http://www.performics.com/news-room/press-release/Search-Engine-
Usage-Study-92-Percent/1422. 
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process of discovery’ but, similar to being in a locked-in job, users often do not venture to discover 
new avenues. Therefore, the evaluation that Google competes on the basis of the merits of its search 
engine alone is wrong given the extent to which its users do not use any alternative engines. 
Furthermore, the efficacy of its horizontal engine could be attributed to its internal algorithmic 
metrics, which insert as many commercial ads as is subjectively and psychologically acceptable for 
TV viewers not to switch to another channel.39 In fact, Google’s algorithmic metric adjusts the ads 
and costs to the advertisers based on the relevance of the link to the search query and the quality of 
the web pages.40 In other words, advertisers pay Google if users click on the ads, which could turn 
into another profitable business if Google were to employ people to click on such ads. Leaving aside 
the maverick that follows from an internal manipulation by Google of its listings of ads based on 
auctioneered ranking, behavioural economics41 could offer some further explanation of the decline 
of quality42 due to the insertion of more ads. Another assumption is that a better search quality 
actually decreases the likelihood that users will click on sponsored ads.43 Therefore, from this 
perspective, Google would be better off not improving the quality of its organic searches. 
These telling facts should never encourage an optimistic expectation that the quasi-monopolist 
should first do something wrong to lose clientele, in other words, sink its own boat,44 before 
competition authorities do something to prevent the anti-competitive lock-in effects on Google’s 
users and its rivals being kept out of the market. Unfortunately, this is not all. Google offers Google 
Places for hotels, restaurants and travel destinations, Google Travel for flights,45 Google Product 
Search for product information and price comparisons, Google Maps for location and direction 
                                                          
39 Similarly, in mergers, the EC, COMP/M5727 – Microsoft/Yahoo! Search, 18 February 2010, para 144-69, where the EC 
assumed that consumers could detect the degradation in quality, see e.g. A Ezrachi and ME Stucke, ‘The Curious Case of 
Competition and Quality’ SSRN Working Paper (2014), 8. 
40 See e.g. GA Manne and JD Wright, ‘Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust Case Against 
Google’ 34 Harvard J of L & Public Policy (2011) 1, 23. 
41 Critically, an intervention to ‘regulate’ Google’s search algorithm could be ‘unconstitutional’; see e.g. A Candeub, 
‘Behavioural Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust’ 9 J of L & Policy 3 (2014). 
42 It is difficult for users to assess the quality of the search results they receive; see e.g., MR Patterson, ‘ Google and Search-
Engine Market Power’, Harvard J of L & Technology (2013) 8. 
43 See e.g. Pollock, cited below, 36. 
44 See e.g. Bork & Sidak’s scenario where Google’s overinvestment in advertisement will trigger a subsequent decline in 
users’ experience; see e.g. RH Bork and JG Sidak, cited above, 4. 
45 For concerns about Google favouring its own travel products, see e.g., M Williams, ‘Expedia is Worried About 
Google/ITA Deal’, Inside Google, 12 July 2010, available at http://www.insidegoogle.com/2010/07/expedia-is-worried-
about-googleita-deal/. 
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information, Google Chrome for browsing, Google Translate for translations, Google Scholar for 
citations of scholarly articles and books and, specifically for entertainment, YouTube for video 
content.46 Similarly, Yahoo offers various categories, such as services, finance, real estate, jobs, 
movies, music, sports, personal, and yellow pages,47 while Amazon offers books, movies, music, 
games, Kindles and so on.  
One can also consider that having indexed a larger amount of information offers Google the 
competitive advantage of a larger search engine48 that can produce better results. Any new entry 
into the market will incur significant investments in building its own search-engine platform, i.e., 
crawling pages, indexing them, and processing queries, and additional sunk costs to make the online 
platform known to users. A similar view suggested in the economic literature49 is that the effect of 
Google’s monopoly in the search engine market is to demand exponentially higher investments, i.e., 
sunk costs, on the part of its incumbents to rival the performance of its search engine. These costs 
represent actual barriers to market entry. 
At this point, one cannot say that there are insurmountable barriers to market entry,50 since there 
are quite a few competitors, albeit with insignificant shares of the market. The problem is that the 
competitive pressure on Google is either ineffective or non-existent. It could therefore be questioned 
whether effective competition is the result of massive investments in innovation, thereby improving 
Google’s search engine. If these investments were gained from the other side of its business, namely, 
sponsored ads, then this is something that Google’s competitors will have to adapt to as a business 
model. Applying the SSNIP (Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price) test is not 
really helpful here; in the horizontal market, users are not charged at all, while in the vertical 
market, no uniform pricing is detectable. 
                                                          
46 See e.g. JD Ratliff and DL Rubinfeld, ‘Is There a Market for Search Engine Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise 
to Antitrust Liability’ J of Comp L & Ec (2014), 4. 
47 Spulber, cited above, 641. 
48 See generally B Pal, ‘Immaterialgüter, Internetmonopole und Kartellrecht’ GRUR-Beilage (2014), 69; M Rato and N Petit, 
‘Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established Standards Reconsidered’ 9 Eur Comp J 1 (2013); J 
Verhaert, ‘The Challenges involved with the application of article 102 TFEU to the new economy: a case study of Google’ 
35 Eur Comp L Rev 6 (2014). 
49 See e.g. Pollock, cited above, 28; Langford, cited below, 1575. 
50 In contrast, see e.g. I Lianos and E Motchenkova, ‘Market Dominance and Search Quality in the Search Engine Market’ J 
of Comp L & Ec (2013), 10, where it is assumed that network effects and the fixed costs related to R&D or the development 
and maintenance of service infrastructure are barriers to entry into the search-engine market. 
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In conclusion, a zero-priced search-engine is a mathematical delusion when approaching a near 
monopoly position with ‘inefficiently low search quality’.51 The real price to pay will be the decline 
in quality as a result of more or aggressive advertising. For rivals to catch up with Google, there are 
certain barriers associated with market entry or with Google’s competitive pressure, in particular, 
building an immense data infrastructure, which could amount to significant fixed costs, 52and 
developing both a search and ranking algorithm. The latter is essentially ‘learning-by-doing’ and, 
therefore, could take years to develop. However, given that the information is a trade secret, a 
possible disclosure of Google’s ranking algorithm could give rise similar criticism as in the 
Microsoft case. Therefore, so far, the monitoring of Google’s behaviour has been the better option 
adopted by the EC. 
 
B. DOMINANCE 
Dominating both primary and secondary markets is crucial to maintaining the clientele from both 
sides of the market, namely, online users who navigate Google’s search engine and traders who pay 
to have commercial ads inserted vertically into it.  
                                                          
51 See e.g. Pollock, cited above, 41. 
52 See e.g. Pollock, cited above, 39. 
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In 2010, the OECD suggested that the global search engine market is highly concentrated in the 
hands of only five major companies,53 who account for over 90% of the market.54 It is no secret that 
Google dominates the European online search-engine market with nearly 90% of the market 
share.55 In the US, recent data acclaim Google as an incontestable leader of general searches with 
81.87% as of March 2014.56 This ever-growing monopoly has been assessed against the 
Microsoft/Yahoo! merger57 where the EC considered it unlikely that the parties could degrade the 
quality of the search engine results due to Google’s presence. When it entered the market in 1998, 
Google was competing only with Microsoft’s MSN (later Live Search), and thereafter, with many 
others such as AltaVista, Yahoo, Infoseek, Lykos,58 or GoTo (later re-named Overture). The latter 
introduced the first auctions of keywords for the listing of ads, followed by Google’s AdWords and 
its settlement with Overture in the patent lawsuit.59  
Google 
Online 
search-
engine 
market 
Google 
Ads 
revenues 
Google 
usage 
Google 
per 
country 
Google 
Vertical integration 
90% EU 
(2012) 
$ 36.5 bn 
(2011) 
15-18 bn 
US Ads 
70% US 
(2010) 
81.57% 
(2009) 
95% 
Germany 
>66% US 
(2012) 
GoogleMaps +50% 
MapQuest Minus 20%  
                                                          
53 According to comScore data in 2009, the five leaders were Google with a 64% market share, Yahoo with 14%, the 
Chinese Baidu with 13%, Microsoft with 4%, and the South Korean Naver with a 2% market share. 
54 OECD, Report on ‘The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries’, DSTI/ICCP (2009) 9/FINAL, April 2010, 28, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/4/44949023.pdf. 
55  See e.g. C Argeton and J Prüfer, ‘Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities’ 8 J of Comp L & Ec 1 (2012). 
56 Statcounter, available at http://www.gs.statcounter.com#desktop+mobile+tablet-search_engine-US-monthly-201401-
201403. 
57 Cited above. 
58 See e.g. S Lawrence and CL Giles, ‘Accessibility of Information on the Web’, 400 Nature 107 (1999). 
59 Spulber, cited above, 645. 
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81.87% 
US 
(2014) 
Facebook  
$ 3.2 
billion 
Yahoo 
10.07% 
MSN 
2.97% 
AOL 
MLS 
Ask 
AltaVista 
all < 1%  
 YouTube >80% 
Photobucket < 3%  
Google Images 50%  
Yahoo Images  >7%  
Google mobile 
Android 
Google 
Vertical 
integration 
Based on the revenues gained from advertisements, anecdotal evidence from 2011 suggests Google 
leads the market with $36.5 billion compared to its competitor, Facebook, with only $3.2 billion. 
Recent US estimates indicate that Google’s US AdWords revenues are ‘somewhere in the range of 
$15 to 18 billion annually’.60 Facebook remains a potential contender in the advertisement market 
for entertainment. The same can be said about the strategic alliance in the Bing/Yelp deal, following 
which reviews of Yelp restaurants could be featured prominently in Bing’s search engine.61 
Based on usage, in 2009, Google was the market leader with 81.57% of the market share, followed 
by Yahoo with 10.07%, MSN with 2.97% and other competitors, including AOL, MLS, Ask, and 
AltaVista, all with less than 1% of the market share.62 However, in 2012, Google held over 95% of 
the market share in Germany and over 66% in the US.63 Another telling fact is that since its free 
vertical integration in Google’s search-engine, Google Maps has gained 50% of the market share, 
while its rival, MapQuest, has lost 20% of its market share.64 The same applies to Google-owned 
YouTube, which has doubled its market share of the video market to over 80%, and is now followed 
by Photobucket with less than 3% and MySpace with less than 1%.65 Google Images enjoys 50% of 
the market share compared to Yahoo Images with over 7% and other competitors with less than 
                                                          
60See e.g., http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/court-orders-google-to-pay-1-36-of-adwords-revenue-for-
infringing-patents/. 
61 See e.g. M Lao, ‘Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal’ 11 Northwestern J of Technology & 
Intellectual Property 5 (2013), 300. 
62 Spulber, cited above, 646. 
63 See Comscore, press release, ‘comScore Releases March 2012 U.S. Search Engine Rankings’, available at 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/4/comScore_Releases_March_2012_U.S._Search_Engine_Ra
nkings. 
64 See e.g. T Körber, ‘Google im Fokus des Kartellrechts’ 7 Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis (2012), 768; Vanberg, cited 
above, 6. 
65 Consumer Watchdog’s Inside Google, ‘Traffic Report: How Google is Squeezing Out Competitors and Muscling Into New 
Markets’, 2 June 2010. 
Forthcoming in The Competition Law Review (2014)                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
12 
 
10% of the market share.66 In the search advertising market, Google was clearly dominant with over 
70% of the US market in 2010.67 
The period from 1998 to 2014, throughout which Google sought to consolidate its prominent and 
thereafter dominant position in the online search-engine market, cannot be considered as merely 
temporary, and the resultant monopoly should not be under-estimated as ‘a little monopoly’.68 
Things may be different in the market for digital devices, but solely on the basis of the period in 
question. However, the intention to maintain Google’s prominent position in the online search-
engine market prevails over purely innovative pursuits of a seemingly unfortunate number of 
thirteen Google applications, namely, Google Chrome, Google Maps, Google Drive, YouTube, Gmail, 
Google+, Google Play Music, Google Play Movies, Google Play Books, Google Play Newsstand, Google 
Play Games, Google+ Photos, and Google+ Hangouts.  
Google mobile 
Android 
Google 
Vertical integration 
78.4% smart-phones  
61.9% tablets (2012) 
Google Maps 65.9% (2nd after Facebook)  
 Google Play 54.4% 
Google Search 53.5% 
Gmail 47.6%  
YouTube 46.4%  
Google also transplanted its successful business model from the world of PCs to mobile devices and 
tablets. In particular, Google’s open source application, Android, which is offered freely to owners of 
mobiles and tablets, is leading the market with 80% of the market share.69 Statistics indicate that 
78.4% of the smartphones and 61.9% of the tablets sold are running Android.70 In 2012, Google 
Maps on mobiles came second after Facebook with 65.9%, followed by Google Play with 54.4%, 
Google Search with 53.5%, Gmail with 47.6%, and YouTube with 46.4%.71 
                                                          
66 Ibid, 5. 
67 Ibid, 7. 
68 See e.g. in the words of J Haucap ‘Monopölchen’, cited above note 3. In contrast to temporary market power, practices 
that facilitate the acquisition of a monopoly should not be immune from intervention. On the effects of social networking, 
see e.g. SW Waller, ‘Antitrust and social networking’ 90 North Carolina L Rev (2012), 1802. 
69See FY Chee and A Oreskovic, ‘European regulators training sights on Google’s mobile software’, Reuters, 30 July 2014. 
70 See Körber, cited below, 14. 
71 See https://www.comscore.com/ger/Insights/Press_Releases/2013/2/comScore Releases the 2013 Mobile Future in Focus 
Report. 
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Android promotes not only Google’s famous search-engine, but also its other free services, such as 
Google Maps and Google Play. The business strategy disguised by Google’s gratuitous Android offer 
seeks to maintain its incontestable online dominance on both static and mobile search-engine 
markets, and, with this in mind, maintains its sponsored links plus traffic-based revenues from 
advertising. Otherwise, the offering enhances consumers’ satisfaction and, through the tying of 
mobile devices to pre-installed software applications, it avoids further fragmentation, too. However, 
the shortcoming is, again, a missed opportunity for Google’s competitors to impose their own 
search-engine on digital devices. 
 
C. THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE AND POTENTIAL ANTI-COMPETITIVE AND/OR UNFAIR 
PRACTICES 
The contentious issue is that Article 102 has traditionally left outside its scope the monitoring of 
marketing strategies of this kind, e.g., through advertising, under the misleading and comparative 
advertisement directive and unfair commercial practices directive.72 In contrast to the Microsoft-
tying case, the borderline between technological and contractual tying is clearly defined since 
Google engages in non-technological tying, irrespective of whether there is a ‘written’ commercial 
agreement to tie advertising to a selected AdWord. What matters is that traders bid online with 
other auctioneers for their Ad to be placed on a ‘priority’ listing. This can only affect the quality of 
the generated search results offered ‘freely’ by Google to its users.73 In other words, commercial 
advertising in this secondary market interferes with free competition in the primary market as it has 
the potential to distort and limit the natural listing of search results through the insertion of these 
paid ads. This contradicts the finding that the priority listing of organic searches is not interfered 
with by Google itself through its own algorithmic sequence. The quality of the organic searches will 
depend on the volume of available advertisements and the suitability of a key word to generate 
‘unfair competition’. 
                                                          
72 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29, 11 May 2005, OJ L 149-22/2005. 
73 For the opinion that ‘what appears nowadays in Google search results pages is increasingly paid-for content’, see e.g. 
Euractiv, ‘Online consumer choice stifled by lack of competition’, 11 April 2014; for the view that ‘when the producer 
primarily earns its profits from one side of the market (such as advertising), its incentive to degrade quality (below levels 
that consumers prefer) on the other side of the market can increase’, see e.g. Ezrachi and Stucke, cited above, 21. 
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The issue of dealing with the protection of competitors and the allegation that Google’s business 
model is set up to favour its own commercial interests to the detriment of those of its competitors 
may go beyond the scope of Article 102 TFEU. For example, one recent complaint from Google’s 
competitors was that it displays specialised search queries, such as hotels, restaurants, or flights, 
more favourably than it displays competing services.74 Therefore, while downgrading vertical 
search services offered by Google’s competitors75 could pose the risk of secondary-line 
discrimination and preferential treatment, this commercial practice appears more suitable to being 
dealt with under, or in conjunction with, the unfair competition rules on advertising rather than 
being captured by Article 102 (c) alone. The first option, namely, a suit on unfair competition, 
should be considered where there are only an insignificant number of competitors at stake and no 
negative effects on final users. Otherwise, a general claim that Google engages in deceptive conduct 
against its users76 could be substantiated on the basis of comparative and misleading advertising, but 
not on the basis of a promotion of its own brand. Such claims could be brought before the EC, 
irrespective of Google’s dominance on the secondary market since the practice is behavioural, and it 
affects competitors directly. This approach was recently applied by a lower court, Landesgericht, in 
Hamburg, which ruled that Google displayed its own content prominently to ‘increase the overall 
attractiveness of its search engine’,77 for which Google enjoys discretion. As such, Google is not 
required ‘to limit itself to a neutral presentation of the results of its search algorithm’.78 In a 
previous ruling, the High Regional Court in Frankfurt held that the use of online ads does not misuse 
a competitor’s trademark as long as inserting the ad into the search engine does not result in ‘clear 
and unambiguous’ advertising.79 In this case, users searching for the registered trademark received 
automatically an advertising link to this competitor’s web site. 
                                                          
74 See MEMO/14/87, cited above. 
75 EC, press release, ‘Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google’, 30 November 2010; 
‘Antitrust: Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address competition concerns’, 25 April 
2013. 
76 This is similar to the US FTC’s Act that empowers the FTC to prevent unfair methods of competition as well as unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices that are likely to mislead a reasonable consumer. 
77 LG Hamburg, Verband Deutscher Wetterdienstleister e.V. v. Google, no 408 HKO 36/13,11 April 2013. 
78 Ibid. 
79 HRC Frankfurt, 6W17/08, 26 February 2008. See also the reference for a preliminary ruling in Joined Cases CC-236/08 
to C-238/08, Google France SARL, Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA; Google France SARL v Viaticum SA, Luteciel 
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However, the demand that third party web publishers purchase ‘all or most’ of their online 
advertisement requirements from Google, made conditional upon purchase to guarantee content 
indexing in Google’s horizontal search engine,80 should be subject to scrutiny under the prohibition 
of contractual tying under Article 102 (d) and (b) on exclusive arrangements. This commercial 
practice affects not only competitors through its foreclosure effect,81 but it directly affects the 
search-engine’s users. By offering consensual commitments, the EC prevented intervention in the 
advertising market by requiring Google to display comparatively specialised searches offered by its 
rivals,82 instead of clarifying the law, namely, whether or not Google had breached Article 102 TFEU 
and/or the harmonising directives on unfair competition. As has already been argued elsewhere, the 
EC made critical use of commitments in investigations such as Google’s, which ‘raise novel legal 
questions or rest upon less-established theories of harm’.83 
It is clear that the EU approach to dominance remains unfortunately too conservative on the concept 
of abuse as an ‘objective’ one.84 The role of subjective indicators, such as the intention to free-ride 
on original publishers’ content85 or to downgrade competing bids in the search-engine results, are 
not taken as prerequisites for a monopolist’s anti-competitive conduct, i.e., deception, though such 
subjective indicators could build a strong case against the monopolist’s deception in advertisements. 
However, Google is immune from any accusation of free-riding since it imposed contractual 
restrictions on the use of its commercial Ads by rival search-engines.86 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
SARL; Google SARL v CNRRH, 23 March 2010, in AD Chiriță, The German and Romanian Abuse of Market Dominance in 
the Light of Article 102 TFEU (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011), 366. 
80 See the EC’s MEMO/14/87, cited above. 
81 See e.g. Lianos and Motchenkova, cited above, 12. 
82 EC, press release, ‘Antitrust: Commission obtains from Google comparable display of specialised search rivals’, 5 
February 2014. 
83 Y Botteman and A Patsa, ‘Towards a more sustainable use of commitment decision in Article 102 TFEU cases’,  1 J of 
Antitrust Enforcement 2 (2013), 348. In the same vein, see very recently Professor R Whish’s Editorial, ‘Motorola and 
Samsung: An Effective Use of Article 7 and Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003’ J of Eur Comp L & Practice (3 September 2014). 
84 See H Schröter, T Jakob, R klotz and W Mederer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2nd ed, 2014), 
840. 
85 See e.g. EC, press release, ‘Antitrust: Commission obtains from Google comparable display of specialised search rivals’, 5 
February 2014; EC Memo, ‘Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google to address competition 
concerns – questions and answers’, 25 April 2013. 
86 However, free-ride on Google is not acceptable see e.g. Speech by J Almunia, ‘Public policies in digital markets: 
reflections from competition enforcement’, 30 June 2014. 
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As has already been mentioned, Google’s atypical non-pricing model to its end-users must extract 
revenues from elsewhere, such as auction bids for Ad placements, or even free-riding from web 
publishers of original content. For example, for indexing purposes, Google effectively uses other web 
publishers’ content, such as text snippets and thumbnails or preview pictures. While this is, indeed, 
beneficial to the average user, who is made aware of the original content, there is also a 
shortcoming to this business model. Once the search-engine becomes a famous brand, publishers 
will certainly claim some revenues for their own inclusion. Then, Google could extract its lost profit 
from more advertising, which, in turn, will inevitably worsen the quality of the search-engine 
experience. 
Google’s successful business model of acquiring incontestable dominance in the search-engine 
market has been made possible by a simultaneous gain in prominence in vertical advertisements. It 
is a sine qua non condition to improve online presence so that traders’ ads will be linked to Google’s 
horizontal platform, which in economics is tantamount to leveraging dominance from one side of 
the market to the other. By displaying its own commercial Ads more prominently, Google cannot 
remain silent on its own altering of the natural occurrence of the search-engine results. This 
manipulative technique can not only discriminate against rivals;87 but it can also affect the quality 
of organic searches offered to all users. 
Nonetheless, regarding Google’s search engine as an essential facility, i.e., a universal search engine 
that is ‘an indispensable distribution tool,’88 is quite hazardous.89 First, there are functionally viable 
alternative search-engines, and while competitors could incur significant costs to reach the 
monopolist’s storage of information90 so as to make the engine more attractive, this has already been 
replicated, though unsuccessfully to date. The ranking methodology, such as search listing, can only 
be considered as proprietary trade secret information rather than an essential input. However, one 
powerful argument in favour of applying the essential facilities doctrine is the current EU loophole 
on the protection of trade secrets. This is due to change following an EU proposal that regulates 
                                                          
87 See e.g. Pal, cited above, 73. 
88 Lianos and Motchenkova, cited above, 16. 
89 For the suggestion that the listing of results be considered as an essential facility, see e.g. Lao, cited below, 302; on the 
inapplicability of the essential facilities doctrine in the case against Google, see Bork and Sidak, cited above, 13. 
90 For the view that duplication of search engines is clearly impossible, see e.g. Argenton and Prüfer, cited above, 97. 
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trade secrets91 as information which is ‘generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question, has commercial value 
because it is secret, and has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret’.92 
The ‘economically viable’ test developed under the EU essential facilities doctrine is also critical to 
the extent to which it could afford competitors’ protection, rather than to address real competition 
law issues. The link to a commercial refusal to deal or supply is entirely missing in the Google case.93 
It is, therefore, clear that a case against Google can be instrumental in creating a new ‘precedent’ 
applicable to instantaneous bids for online advertisements targeted at dynamic searchers rather 
than following old-fashioned doctrines where the input is statically physical and not virtually 
dynamic. 
Finally, the most powerful argument against Google’s anti-competitive conduct that harms final 
consumers directly is their online monitoring and gathering of personal information,94 such as 
server logs from users’ browsers, which is passed on to advertisers and used for commercial 
purposes.95 Similar to Microsoft’s problem of the lack of interoperability of its Windows Operating 
System with non-competing systems, the Achilles’ heel that demands vigorous scrutiny and 
intervention is not the existing competition on its rather insignificant (Windows Media Player or 
search-engine) market, but is the general public interest in ensuring that a privately-owned 
corporation does not successfully expand over so many tiny, inoffensive, and innovative markets in 
                                                          
91 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of undisclosed know-how and 
business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, Brussels, 28 November 2013, 
COM (2013) 813 final. 
92 See e.g. the timely contribution of N Sousa e Silva, ‘What exactly is a trade secret under the proposed directive’, J of 
Intellectual Property Law and Practice (2014). 
93 This time, the scope of the doctrine is different from Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents, [1974] ECR 223; Case 238/87, 
Volvo v Veng, [1988] ECR 6211; Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, [1998], ECR I-7791; Case C-418/01, IMS Health, [2004], 
ECR I-5039; Case C-52/09, TeliaSonera, [2011] ECR I-0000; Case C-209/10, Post Danmark, [2012] ECR I-0000. 
94 On the ‘right to be forgotten’, see C-131/12, Google v AEPD and Costeja, 13 May 2014; H Crowther, ‘Google v Spain: is 
there now a ‘right to be forgotten’?’ J of Intellectual Property L & Practice (2014). However, free-ride on Google is not 
acceptable; see e.g. Speech by J Almunia, ‘Public policies in digital markets: reflections from competition enforcement’, 30 
June 2014. 
95 See the concern expressed by the German Monopolies Commission on the use of private data by Google and Facebook, 
Monopolkommission, press release, ‘Google, Facebook and Co. – eine Herausforderung für Wettbewerbspolitik’, 
Bonn/Berlin, 9 July 2014; see e.g. A Gebicka and A Heinemann, ‘Social Media and Competition Law’ 37 World Comp L & 
Ec Rev 2 (2014). 
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order to enjoy the monopolistic power over its users’ personal data, which could be passed on to 
third parties for commercial advertising. This is similar to the loyalty cards offered by supermarkets, 
which monitor buyers’ preferences and eventually offer them discounts on their next shopping.  
However, Google’s quasi-dominance on the search-engine market could raise legitimate national 
and EU security concerns, which explains the political sensitivity of this case. This is why the 
Bundeskartellamt proposed recently that Google should be regulated as ‘utilities’.96 In sharp 
contrast, a policy proposal has been put forward by economists according to which ‘all search 
engines should be required to share their anonymized data on clicking behaviour of users following 
previous research queries’.97 While allowing competing search engines access to the users’ 
behavioural data makes perfect economic sense, the EU rules governing privacy98 and security 
would not allow this to happen, even if the data were anonymised. 
 
III. GOOGLE’S ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ON ADJACENT LEISURE MARKETS  
In the US, the consumer class action submitted that Google made its most popular applications, such 
as mobile and tablet Android applications, including the Google Phone-top Search app,99 YouTube, 
Google Maps, Gmail, and Google Play, all of which enable mobile customers to buy music, movies, 
and books from the Google Play store, subject to an unlawful tie-in secret agreement called ‘Mobile 
Application Distribution Agreement’.100 The latter required manufacturers of mobile phones and 
tablets to make Google the default search engine on all of their devices sold to consumers 
worldwide. For example, it is submitted that ‘Google uses its popular apps to coerce manufacturers 
into making it the default search engine provider on handheld devices’.101 All of the above 
agreements are ‘contracts in restraint of trade’102 and fall under the scope of the US Sherman Act. 
                                                          
96 PC Tech, N Kamanzi, ‘Germany Cartel Offices Says Google Could be Regulated as Utilities’, 14 July 2014. 
97 C Argenton and J Prüfer, ‘Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities’ 8 J of Comp L & Ec (2012) 1, 77. 
98 See e.g. EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ 
[2005] L281 , and the proposal for a new EU Data Protection Regulation, available at ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/. 
99 A widget for conducting web searches via Google’s search engine. 
100 US Class Action, para 74. 
101 US Class Action, para 32. 
102 US Class Action, para 7. 
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Thus, the plaintiffs mention various other acts dealing with unfair methods of competition, such as 
the Clayton Act or California’s Unfair Competition Act.  
‘Google has conditioned the rights to pre-load any application from a suite of Google applications, 
including the YouTube app or the Google Play client, on the manufacturer’s mandatory acceptance 
and installation of Google search, or so-called Google Phone-top Search, as the default search 
engine on that device’.103 
This means that if a smartphone or tablet manufacturer wishes to pre-load the popular YouTube 
app on a given Android device, then it has to make Google the default search engine, too.104 In other 
words, ‘a manufacturer would struggle to offer a phone without a pre-installed YouTube app’,105 
which makes mandatory the adoption of the default engine. The same technique applies to other 
rivals, for example, were AOL to pre-load its MapQuest onto Android mobile devices.106 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs submitted that Google had paid Apple hundreds of millions of dollars to 
act as the default engine on Apple iPhones, iPads, and iPods.107 This pre-installing trend is noticeable 
on Samsung, too. 
A mitigating factor is that, unlike in the Microsoft tying case,108 where users could not remove the 
Windows Media Player, mobile devices entail Google’s default search-engine is set up by 
manufacturers; thus, users are able to download other applications, interoperate, and/or change the 
settings.109 Of course, as in the Microsoft-Internet Explorer tying case,110 users may lack basic IT 
skills while downloading and installing an internet browser other than the default one, as well as 
inertia. Google’s business model is the same: offering Android for mobile devices free of charge. This 
means that should a user decide to install competing applications, there is no guarantee that they 
will also be offered for free. A flexible option to switching may still require extra costs and operate 
as a potential barrier to market entry. This makes any pre-loading and pre-installation not 
                                                          
103 US Class Action Complaint 010437-11 683086 VI, para 74. 
104 Ibid, para 33. 
105 Ibid, para 40. 
106 Ibid, para 53. 
107 Ibid, para 62. 
108 Case COMP/C-3/37792 – Microsoft (WMP), OJ L 32-23/2007; Case T-201/2004, Microsoft, [2007] ECR II-3601. 
109 See e.g. T Körber, ‘Let’s Talk About Android – Observations on Competition in the Field of Mobile Operating Systems’, 2, 
available on SSRN. 
110 See Case COMP/C-3/39530 – Microsoft (Internet Explorer). 
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particularly user friendly both to intermediary consumers, i.e., competitors, and to final consumers, 
i.e. ordinary users.111 Therefore, combining both tying cases, the answer is that intervention against 
Google could proceed. This is unlike the seemingly inconsistent, shifting approach to network effects 
pronounced in recent merger proceedings.112 In Cisco Systems and Messagenet,113 the General 
Court (GC) departed from the previous Microsoft cases as there were no technical or economic 
constraints that could have prevented intermediary consumers, active on a narrower market for 
business communications, from downloading competing services on their device. The merged entity 
between Windows Live Messenger and Skype raised no entry barriers as the communications 
software had been offered for free, being made easy to be downloaded by corporate clients and 
occupying a limited space on their PC’s hard drive. In this scenario, switching was found to be 
relatively easy and multi-homing possible. However, the business model operated by the merged 
entity is slightly different from Google’s in that the free offering of communications to final 
consumers is made possible by the revenues extracted from the placement of commercial 
advertisements, while corporate clients are in no way subsidised by the final users. Rather, such 
intermediary users themselves have to pay for their enterprise communications services. However, 
what makes the previous approach to network effects inconsistently applied is precisely the much 
narrower scope for the definition of the relevant market for businesses’ communications services, as 
opposed to those of final users. 
Unfortunately, the EU merger policy and the prohibition of abuse of dominance may bring about 
contradicting outcomes. The recent approval by the EC of the acquisition by Facebook of WhatsApp 
was justified due to the flexible switching by customers from one mobile application to another, the 
popularity of the network amongst users, and the fast growing market for consumer 
communications apps, in particular, its ‘short innovation cycles’.114 The initial premise for allowing 
a merger appears to be that an emergence of dominance ex post is to be ignored a priori because of 
                                                          
111 For the view that the storage memory of the Google suit of apps is negligible, see e.g. Körber, cited above, 42. 
112 For an insightful analysis, see e.g. I Graef, ‘Sneak preview of the future application of European competition law on the 
Internet?: Cisco and Messagenet’ 51 CML Rev (2014), 1263-1280. 
113 Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet SpA v Commission, 11 December 2013, paras 79-81. 
114 See recently, EC, press release, ‘Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook’, IP/14/1088, 
Brussels, 3 October 2014. 
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the unknown pace of an innovation cycle. This merger-friendly approach can only sit awkwardly 
when, under Article 102, it is thereafter suspected that Facebook may be dominant on the social 
networking platforms. It highlights how following preceding evaluations of network effects applied 
in the context of allowing mergers is simply a false friend should it be followed in another area. 
While the quantification and recovery of the research and innovation pursuits by Google could be 
extremely difficult to measure, the revenues extracted from its commercial advertising represents a 
valid indicator that Google does not compete only on the basis of its zero-priced and innovative 
search-engine. 
A final argument in support of intervention has to consider the user’s experience, which has to be 
balanced somewhere in the middle to avoid a panoply of pre-installed applications, such as Desk 
Clock, Browser, Calendar, Contacts, Gallery, Global Search, Launcher, Music, Google Talk, and 
Settings, against the danger of fragmentation. Would the average user be better off without pre-
installing these additional features? Based on the current consumers’ class action, the balance seems 
to be tipped in favour of a ‘yes’ answer. 
The plaintiffs questioned primarily the existence of a mandatory secret tie-in agreement, whether 
Google unlawfully monopolized or attempted to monopolize the search engine market in respect of 
the Android apps, and whether consumer harm can be established from consumers having paid 
more for mobile devices115 with such pre-installed features than they could otherwise have paid had 
more choice been available.116 In other words, this raises another pertinent question of whether 
when buying the mobile hard-core device, any increment will also be paid towards the running of 
software applications. Since Google has paid manufacturers of mobile devices for inclusion, this 
could be a competitive advantage to enhance consumers’ experience. However, as no such apps’ 
costs are passed on to consumers, the pre-installing of Google features could be used as an artificial 
means to maintain its present dominance, rather than as a natural enhancement of the hard-core 
device. In the long run, the effects on consumers will be a loss of choice and possibly a lack of 
innovation. 
                                                          
115 For the contrary opinion that Google’s offering of Android as open source software has actually lowered the price of 
mobile devices, see Körber, cited above, 4. 
116 Ibid, paras 79 a, c, and e. 
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The above practice is similar in scope to Article 102 (d) TFEU, which prohibits ‘making the 
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations (…) 
which have no connection with the subject of such contracts’. In particular, the above contractual 
tie-in agreement could eventually oblige manufacturers of digital services to pre-install, 
predominantly or exclusively, Google’s Android applications content and to accept its online search 
engine by default.117 This commercial practice, obviously, pre-empts the choice of individual 
users,118 namely, using or downloading other competing applications and/or search engines. The 
practice is anti-competitive as it encourages final users of smartphones and tablets to experience 
only Google’s pre-installed applications. The purpose of this business strategy has to be understood 
in the wider context of maintaining Google’s reputation and dominance in the horizontal and 
vertical search-engine markets. Due to such sunk costs, for example, the offering of Android 
applications as open source software, Google’s rivals are practically denied an effective entry into 
the market for digital devices, which are mostly used for personal entertainment. In addition, 
YouTube and Google Play installation is also made conditional upon the manufacturer’s pre-
instalment of Google Phone-top search. 
FairSearch’s complaint against Google119 is similar to the criticism of the US’s plaintiff, i.e., that 
‘Android phone makers who want to include must-have Google apps such as Maps, YouTube or 
Play are required to pre-load an entire suite of Google mobile services and to give them prominent 
default placement on the phone’. This obviously places Google at a competitive advantage vis-à-vis 
its competitors. 
One can sum up from the above that Google’s ubiquitous presence120 has imposed itself not only on 
PCs but also on all other digital devices. In the light of these recent developments, similar to the 
                                                          
117 On Android as a ‘Trojan Horse’ see e.g. Chillin’ Competition, ‘Some thoughts on the new anti-Google (Android) 
complaint’ available at http://chillingcompetition.com/2013/09/09/some-thoughts-on-the-new-anti-google-android-
com. 
118 US Class Action, para 64, where the plaintiffs emphasised the lack of choice and the stifling of innovations as a result of 
Google’s monopoly. 
119 See http://www.fairsearcheurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FairSearch-Announces-EU-Complaint-on-Google-
Mobile-Strategy-9-April-2013.pdf. 
120 Recently it has been suggested that Android forced access to a ‘collection’ of thirteen Google applications, namely 
Google Chrome, Google Maps, Google Drive, YouTube, Gmail, Google+, Google Play Music, Google Play Movies, Google 
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booking of cheap or last minute flights or hotels,121 the previous allegations of ‘biased’ or 
‘manipulated’ search results122 in the advertisement market have gained more weight. It is plausible 
to think of Google’s search engine giving priority to a good number of commercial ads over others, 
which will remove the expected ‘neutrality’123 when generating results in the primary search-
engine market. For example, airline companies were found to have weighted in their booking system 
carrier-specific factors, to have inflated the flight times of competitors, to have blocked flights with 
lower fares, and so on.124 
A dangerous option is allowing cross-subsidisation from the free primary market to expand over the 
secondary digital market. Then, Google’s brand and popularity in the primary market will leverage 
the secondary to the detriment of other competing applications. Recently, a Portuguese competitor, 
Aptoide, submitted to the EC that Google is ‘leveraging’ its dominant position in the Android market 
to control the market for such applications.125 
The litigious aspect of intervention could follow suit under the umbrella of unfair competition; thus, 
the crucial element is that the likelihood of exclusionary conduct exists. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to see how users or final consumers, who know little about how the search itself operates, could be 
alerted to the decline in the quality of the search engine. The secrecy of Google’s algorithmic metric 
has already been referred to as creating a ‘black box’ effect126 with the consequence that consumers 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Play Books, Google Play Newsstand, Google Play Games, Google+ Photos and Google+ Hangouts, in Quartz, ‘Google is 
‘tightening the screws’ on Android to keep control over the web’, 26 September 2014. 
121 See Hazan, cited below, 805. 
122 See e.g. B Edelman, ‘Hard-Coding Bias in Google ‘Algorithmic’ Search Results’, 15 November 2010, available at 
http://www.benedelman.org/hardcoding/; J Hazan, ‘Stop Being Evil: A Proposal for Unbiased Google Search’ 111 Michigan 
L Rev (2013) 789; for the view that the appearance of Google’s products in search results is three times higher than for 
non-Google products, see e.g., B Edelman and B Lockwood, ‘Measuring Bias in ‘Organic’ Web Search’, available at 
http://www.bededelman.org/searchbias/; BG Edelman, ‘Google’s Dominance and What to Do About It’ 2 J of Law, ACS Blog 
‘Debate on Antitrust Scrutiny of Google: Benjamin G. Edelman vs. Joshua D. Wright’, 453: ‘It’s handy to have a single 
Google password providing access to personalized search, finance, videos, and more. But this misses the serious harms of 
Google’s ever-broadening panoply of services’; for the view that it is possible to manipulate or trick algorithm results, see 
e.g. L Introna and H Nissenbaum, ‘Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engine Matters’ 16 The Information 
Society 3 (2000), 141. 
123 For an interesting contribution on neutrality, see M Thompson, ‘In Search of Alterity: on Google, neutrality, and 
otherness’14 Tulane J of Technology & Intellectual Property (2011). 
124 See e.g. Langford, cited above, 1587. 
125‘Google hit with new antitrust complaint in Europe, officials confirm’, 23 June 2014, available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2364580/google-hit-with-new-antitrust-complaint-in-... 
126  See O Bracha and F Pasquale, ‘Federal Search Commission? Fairness, Access and Accountability in the Law of Search’ 
93 Cornell L Rev (2008), 1149. 
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lack the knowledge to realise they are being misled. As long as the results do not become merely 
advertising, it is the task of the competition authorities to monitor how the search engine operates 
and to require manufacturers to include competing applications on digital devices. Pre-installing 
certain features can work only in Google’s favour to gain an anti-competitive advantage and not to 
compete exclusively on the merit of its products. Limiting ab initio consumer choice can only have a 
‘lock-in’ effect on consumers who cannot experience the quality of alternative products or services, 
thereby foreclosing potential competition. Nonetheless, this approach is very much consumer-
welfare focused. Advocates of non-intervention appear somewhat malicious to a consumer-welfare 
approach since in the long run, Google’s aggressive business model conquers every single digital 
market. It cannot be that in the name of avoiding fragmentation, all pre-installed features are made 
by Google. 
From the conundrum of arguments for and against intervention in the case of Google, one clear 
conclusion is that, unlike the US Sherman Act, having an open-textured provision in Article 102 
makes it easier to attack Google’s abuse in the leisure digital market since exclusive and conditional 
agreements harm both intermediary and final consumers, thereby maintaining Google’s dominant 
position. Anti-competitive practices of this kind are to be fined rather than negotiated and finalised 
with light-touch commitments. The monitoring of Google for the next five years and three months 
will partially solve the existing problems. For example, Google will cease to include ‘any unwritten 
obligations’ in future contracts, which could amount to a de facto exclusivity agreement to source 
any commercial requirements for ads solely from Google.127 This behavioural remedy cannot 
address the past anti-competitive harm caused to competitors. What appears as a daunting task for 
Google is to create a pool of eligible Rival Vertical Search Sites according to objective criteria 
established by the EC. The site domain should enjoy some popularity based on its usage data and 
may not engage in harmful commercial practices, such as the deception of search engines, including 
index gaming, sneaky redirects, keyword stuffing, link spamming, or any other practices designed to 
deceive or manipulate legitimate site indexing and ranking.128 The EC also mentioned the deception 
                                                          
127 See EC, Commitments, Case COMP/C-3/39740 – Foundem and others, 3 April 2013. 
128 Ibid. 
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of consumers through deceptive or frustrating navigation, bait and switch advertising, deceptive 
billing practices, or other practices that mislead consumers. The end effect of what is being 
implemented is a ‘regulation’ of online commerce aimed at prohibiting deceptive practices to users 
and competitors. It is a welcome development that the specialised vertical market has been opened 
to external competition from Google’s rivals. However, while this may be pleasing to Google’s 
competitors, overall, these commitments do not touch upon the potential manipulation of results by 
Google’s own algorithmic metrics. The orientation of commitments is towards responding to 
competitors’ complaints, while the commitments remain minimalistic in terms of dealing with wider 
concerns in the horizontal search-engine market. Given that more vertical searches will be 
included, this could have a negative impact on the users’ experience in the primary market. 
At the EU level, the existing Electronic Commerce Directive129 also provides for a mechanism to 
apply for an injunction aimed at ‘the protection of the collective interests of consumers’.130 This 
mechanism is devised to facilitate the free movement of services, thereby ensuring ‘a high level of 
consumer protection’. Member States may only restrict the free movement of services in exceptional 
cases of ‘public security, including the safeguarding of national security and defence, and the 
protection of consumers’.131 Therefore, in the absence of a specialist regulation of online commerce, 
Article 6 of the Electronic Commerce Directive could be helpful as it refers, in particular, to 
commercial communications, i.e., advertising, including promotional offers, such as discounts, 
premiums, gifts, and unsolicited advertisements. In the eyes of its end-users, Google’s search-engine 
operates an online system of unsolicited advertisements. Furthermore, the area of competition is not 
excluded from the scope of application of this directive, as are, notably, tax, VAT, fiscal, or data 
protection issues. 
 
                                                          
129 See e.g. the EC Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic 
commerce), OJ [2000] 178/1. 
130 See recital 53. 
131 See Article 3 (4) (a) (i). 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The negotiated and re-negotiated commitments in the Google investigation are an attempt to 
regulate online commercial advertising that is taking place when, on one side, users search for 
keywords while on the other, advertisers bid for such keywords to distract users’ attention. What 
once was essentially a process of searching through the internet has evolved into an advertising 
engine. A giant processor of a vast amount of information, Google has been under fire from 
competitors who felt downgraded in commercial search results when bidding for a place in 
specialised ads. The EC chose not to respond with a fine on the alleged anti-competitive conduct, as 
has traditionally been the case, but to remedy a truly complicated situation. Unfortunately, the 
proposed commitments fail to clearly address a wider competition concern over the possible decline 
in the quality of the organic search results as a result of more commercial ads, which will have an 
impact on Google’s final users/consumers.  
The commitments accepted by Google are not only quite long, but are also ambiguous 
pronouncements of the law applicable to Google’s future conduct in the market. Therefore, the lack 
of an erga omnes effect of these commitments means they are limited to Google only, instead of 
clarifying the law for the benefit of many other online service providers, including advertisers. 
However, the most sensitive aspect of the above commitments remains the fact that they are not 
being exposed to judicial review. Therefore, unless they are successfully implemented and accepted 
by Google’s vocal competitors and final users, such commitments may, indeed, weaken EU 
competition enforcement, in particular, in the area of abuse of dominance where the number of 
preceding prohibition decisions by the DG COMP has significantly declined since the famous 
Microsoft ruling. Probably, the widespread criticisms of the theories of harm and network effects 
employed by the EC in the latter ruling discouraged the DG COMP from taking a bolder action. 
Nonetheless, one thing is clear: irrespective of whether there will be a case or not, there will always 
be an angle of criticism for academics to lean on. However, the final decision rests in the very 
capable hands of the DG COMP to review the matter giving careful consideration of all the facts of 
the case, without any fear of further consequences and outside pressures, coming notably from the 
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colour of politicians who also include the Commissioner for Competition, national ministers, and 
many more. 
 
 
